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Abstract 
 
Mortality seems to have no place in the theories on subjectivity in Kant and 
Husserl. It is suggested that this entente cordiale is an expression of the 
shared principle at the heart of their philosophy, i.e. the principle of self-
preservation. Self-preservation is a principle that in a certain sense excludes 
mortality. It is argued that the primary sense of this exclusion is not 
theoretical but practical. Kant and Husserl are both endorsing the imperative 
that man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts (cf. Mann 
1976, 600). The positive correlate to this is to be found in the demand that 
man should think of himself as if he was immortal. With special regard to 
Husserl the predicament that accompanies his relentless attempt to fulfill 
this demand is described as a sluice through which anthropology threatens to 
flow into the phenomenological enterprise. 
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“Der freie Mensch denkt an nichts weniger als an den Tod;  
und seine Weisheit ist nicht ein Nachsinnen über den Tod,  
sondern ein Nachsinnen über das Leben.” 
(Spinoza 1950, 247) 
 
“Sagen Sie Herr Professor Kant worauf begründet sich  
die mehr oder weniger permanente Todesfurcht 
die Angst vor dem Ende? KANT aufbrausend:  
Sagen Sie nicht das Wort Ende.“ 
(Bernhard 1988, 307) 
 
“Ich kämpfe ständig mit der Ungunst der Umstände, zum Teil  
solchen, die in mir selbst, in meinen schwachen Kräften liegen.“ 
Husserl (Schumann 1977, 213) 
                                                 
* The author wishes to thank Carlsbergfondet for financial support. META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
  438 
 
 
 
I. Opening 
 
Existentialist philosophy has made us accustomed to the 
thought that subjectivity has an intimate relation to its own 
mortality. However, in Kant and Husserl we will look in vain 
for an elaboration on what it means for subjectivity that it is 
mortal. There is no theory on subjectivity and mortality to be 
found. It is in a way astonishing to make this observation. How 
can it be possible? How can such an important and weighty 
issue as mortality play no role in two of the most 
comprehensive theories on subjectivity in our philosophical 
tradition? How is it possible that the significance of mortality 
should be completely overlooked? The hypothesis I would like 
to consider is, that the absence of mortality in Kant and 
Husserl is not a theoretical lapses or a philosophical deficiency. 
It is not even a blind spot, but on the contrary an intentional 
evasion. This evasion is a consequence of the principle at the 
heart of both Kant’s and Husserl’s conception of subjectivity, 
i.e. the principle of self-preservation (Sommer 1977; Sommer 
1987). 
The clearest expression of this commonality is perhaps 
exactly the implicit denial of mortality as in any why 
significant for the self-understanding of subjectivity. Self-
preservation is a principle for which it is constitutive in a 
certain sense to rule out death. Whatever is structured by the 
principle of self-preservation is nothing but self-preservation 
and has accordingly no inherent or intrinsic relation to its own 
annihilation. Spinoza gave this principle a universal 
metaphysical articulation in his doctrine of conatus. According 
to this every particular thing strives to preserve its own being. 
Nothing in the thing opposes this strive and annihilation must 
consequently be brought about externally. When this principle 
is elevated into a principle of subjectivity it loses its substantial 
appearance. It is not so that first there is a being and then, 
secondly, what this being does to preserve itself. Subjectivity is 
not a thing that preserves itself, rather it is self-preservation. 
And it is in the movement of self-preservation that all 
substantial being is constituted. As Husserls puts it in a very 
condense formulation: ”Ich bin nicht erst und erhalte mich Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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hinterher, Sein ist Selbsterhaltung” (Husserl 1973b, 367). 
Considered as “pure” self-preservation,  subjectivity has, just 
like Spinoza’s conatus, no relation to its own annihilation. This 
feature can be traced in the very structure of self-
consciousness. Self-consciousness cannot think itself away, but 
must always, whatever it posits, preserve itself as the positing 
self. This implies that subjectivity and mortality must be alien 
to each other. As already Epicurus said: when we are, death is 
not, and when death is, we are not.  
Admittedly the formality and triviality of this seems 
somewhat faint or even superficial when contrasted with the 
more profound and concrete experiences, which existentialist 
philosophers can offer. It may very well be, that we cannot 
think ourselves away – but does that change the deep impact 
which the knowledge of our most certain death has upon us? Is 
this view on subjectivity and mortality anything else but the 
inauthentic denial of the bourgeois? To see how it might be 
more than this, it is important not to be content with the 
descriptive argument from self-consciousness alone. It is 
necessary to acquire a sense of the normative aspect of the 
matter. The exclusion of death, which we find in Kant and 
Husserl, is not primarily a result of a theoretical argument. It 
is not so that mortality is not significant because it has no 
bearing, when subjectivity is conceived of as self-preservation. 
It is rather so, that subjectivity is conceived of as self-
preservation because in this way it is possible to avoid that 
death attains the dominion of our thoughts. The descriptive 
argument – that we cannot think our own mortality – only 
comes into play, when the normative stance has already been 
taken: we should not think of our own mortality. However, in 
order to fully exclude death from our thoughts it is not enough 
to leave a vacuum that would otherwise be occupied with 
thoughts of death. We should re-occupy this vacancy in our 
system of metaphysical questions with a notion, which 
prevents mortality from re-entering our self-understanding. It 
is in other words required that we positively think of ourselves 
as if we were immortal. Kant and Husserl share this 
imperative. In the following remarks on subjectivity and META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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immortality they are my key figures of reference, although I 
will mainly stick with Husserl.  
 
II. Two thanatologies 
 
What is the relation between subjectivity and mortality? 
Taking a swift glance at our tradition I suppose it would not be 
completely inadequate to say, that two answers have been 
given to this question. The first thanatology states that the 
idea of mortality is inscribed in what it means for a self to be a 
self. The second denies this. The associated pragmatic 
implications differ vastly. Let us consider the first case: The 
active life of human beings would never unfold, if this life was 
not structured up against deadlines – in the end up against the 
ultimate deadline. Subjectivity, or at least human subjectivity, 
is Sein-zum-Tode. And, one might add, luckily so! For if this 
was not the case, human life would dissolve into utter passivity 
and boredom. It would never amount to anything. Why should I 
do something now, when I have unlimited time? The tension – 
and this word is of cause derived from the Latin term tentio 
meaning I am tense, I worry, I mind, I care etc. – so, the tension 
involved in intentionality would never come about without 
mortality. Subjectivity would not establish any directedness 
toward what in appropriate philosophical abstraction is usually 
called  the world. It would be like Epicurus’ immortal Gods: 
careless (ohne Sorge) and world-less (Weltlos). To be directed 
towards, to carry out, to think about and to act – for all this it 
is necessary to concentrate, to gather strength, to focus and to 
aim. And this, in turn, is only possible if life – in its totality 
and in all its moments alike – is affected by its inherent 
mortality. Only in this way can life attain significance.  
The outlook in the second case is quite different: The active 
life of human beings would never unfold, if this life was 
accompanied by the idea of its mortality. In order to have a vita 
activa at all, man must not think of his own death. The 
memento mori does not entail a meaningful view on pragmatic 
life. And, one might add, this is not surprising, since the motif 
behind this topos is to remind us of the vanity of earthly 
existence. It is not designed to encourage pragmatic Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
 
  
441 
 
 
 
involvement in the world, but to sharpen our soteriological 
senses. Incessantly contemplating death does not help us 
concentrate and gather our strength, but consigns us to a state 
of paralysis and apathy. Why should I do anything, when 
nothing matters in the end – when all I do and accomplish will 
be forgotten and when it eventually will be as if I never 
existed? In order to act and to carry out man must banish, 
reject, repress or otherwise forget the idea of mortality. And 
this in turn is only possible if life – in its totality and all its 
moments alike – is affected by its inherent immortality. The 
way I have lived has an everlasting importance; it determines 
the way I will spend my immortality - only a perspective 
similar to the kind provided by an obsolete notion like this 
bestows life with significance. Accordingly man must live at 
least as if he was immortal. 
 
III. Husserl versus Heidegger 
 
According to Heidegger death is inscribed in subjectivity as a 
Sein-zum-Tode. This is a crucial point of difference to Husserl. 
Husserl stresses the infinite immanence of subjectivity. What 
is the phenomenological basis for doing this? The answer is 
that from the phenomenological point of view subjectivity is 
given for itself without beginning or end. This has to do with 
the structure of inner time-consciousness that pertains to all 
intentionality. Subjectivity cannot remember any conscious 
state as being the first or imagine any conscious state as being 
the last – because all conscious states are accompanied by the 
retention of previous and the protention of coming states. This 
so called lived presence is the necessary condition of 
intentionality as such. It is the basic form of its self-
preservation in as much as it is the alternative to the atomistic 
time-conception and its accompanying idea of a transitive 
preservation. It is, in other words, a condition for intentionality 
that it in itself has no relation to its own mortality. Accordingly 
we find, perhaps surprisingly, that all that which Heidegger 
describes under the heading Uneigentlichkeit is in fact a 
notable and important contribution to a theory of subjectivity 
as structured by self-preservation. What characterizes the META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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inauthentic mode of intentionality – or Sorge – is precisely that 
it inhabits a life-world by neglecting its Sein-zum-Tode. In 
everyday life it appears as if man does not really believe that 
he eventually will die. For Husserl there is no need to label this 
as inauthentic. Far from being inauthentic if neglecting their 
own mortality, human beings rather participate in 
transcendental subjectivity in this way. But more on this point 
later. 
 
IV. Retention and transcendental subjectivity 
 
Even though subjectivity from the phenomenological point of 
view does not know its beginning or ending, this is of course 
not evidence for the belief that the phenomenologist as an 
empirical human being is immortal. The immortality of 
subjectivity – not only its immanent infinity – would entail 
that beginning and ending are not only not phenomenologically 
given, but that there is no beginning or end. This is not the 
case for human life. A human life has a factual beginning and a 
factual end, although both of these are essentially not given. 
Let us, however, as brave phenomenologists leave facts aside 
and concentrate on the essential i.e. on consciousness as such 
or transcendental subjectivity!  
Transcendental subjectivity has no factual beginning or 
end. It is nothing but pure immanent infinity. And exactly this 
– immanent infinity without factual beginning or end – is what 
Husserl understands to be the immortality of transcendental 
subjectivity. Husserl writes: “Aber das transzendentale 
urtümliche Leben […] kann nicht aus dem Nichts werden und 
ins Nichts übergehen, es ist „unsterblich“, weil das Sterben 
dafür keinen Sinn hat etc.“ (Husserl 1993, 338)  Following this 
line of thought, transcendental subjectivity could be described 
as possessing an infinite retention – or metaphorically 
speaking: it could be described as being in a state where 
everything clings eternally. Nothing gradually fades away until 
it is totally gone – everything is retained and simultaneously 
given in one lived and eternal presence. This may seem 
speculative. And it is undoubtedly articulated in a form closer 
to traditional theological conceptions than Husserl’s taste Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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would agree to. But it is, nevertheless, a very obvious idea 
considering the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. In 
fact if we follow this phenomenology what is in need of 
explanation seems to be why the retention of intentionality 
should not be infinite. 
 
V. Recollection and anthropological subjectivity 
 
Husserl leaves us no doubt regarding the mortality of human 
beings: “Der Mensch kann nicht unsterblich sein. Der Mensch 
stirbt notwendig. Der Mensch hat keine weltliche Präexistenz, 
in der zeit-räumlichen Welt war er früher nichts, und wird er 
nachher nichts sein.“ (Husserl 1993, 338) The paradox is, 
however, that we know this, but cannot think it. As intentional 
subjects we can neither think our own beginning nor our own 
ending. And this unthinkable beginning and ending does not 
even have to be the capital ones usually known as birth and 
death. The minor cases have the same feature. The intentional 
life which unfolds between waking up and falling asleep 
possess the same immanent infinity. After waking up we 
cannot depict any intentional state as being the first. For as 
long as I can remember I was always already awake – and this 
is true for the same reasons it is true that for as long as I can 
remember I was always already alive. However, we know that 
our retention is in fact not infinite even though it is essentially 
given this way. It gradually fades away. We don’t know exactly 
where it ends, but we know that it has ended – and from where 
do we know this? The simple answer is: from the fact that we 
recollect.  
Now, it is important to see that it is actually highly 
surprising that recollection should become a form of 
intentionality at all. The appropriate perspective is provided by 
the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness. Following the 
descriptions given here, it becomes all but clear why the 
retention of intentionality should be limited. For why should 
that which is held back in retention eventually slip away? This 
cannot be shown to be essential for intentionality. And 
intentionality would not need to re-collect, were it not that the 
perfect continuity of an infinite retention was somehow META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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interrupted. Re-collection is the gathering – collectio  – of 
something that belongs together but has somehow become 
dissociated. It is – to put it pathologically – a symptom of a 
delimited retention. This leads to the question: Is recollection a 
factual form of subjectivity pertaining to a specific empirical 
incarnation of subjectivity, say for instance human beings? Has 
it perhaps to do with what Husserl referred to as the 
narrowness of human consciousness? Is it an expression of the 
economy of a consciousness which cannot have all at once?  
Questions like these give rise to the idea that re-collection 
is not part of transcendental subjectivity, but is a form of 
intentionality which human subjectivity constitutes to remedy 
its imperfect self-preservation. It may be that human 
intentionality is structured as a lived presence. And it may be 
that this guarantees that intentional life does not dissolve into 
atomistic time-capsules, which, if held together at all, is held 
together only be external intervention. But it does not 
guarantee that human intentional life is without discontinuity. 
Oblivion, sleep, coma, boredom and unconsciousness are among 
the troublesome interruptions of human intentional life. And 
ultimately death is the termination of this life. So we can – or 
perhaps even must – distinguish between the perfect self-
preservation of transcendental subjectivity and the fragile self-
preservation of human subjectivity that must constantly 
overcome dissociations in its intentional life – and in the end 
fail. 
 
VI. Transcendental and anthropological subjectivity 
 
When considering the question of immortality and asking 
about the relation between transcendental and anthropological 
subjectivity in Husserl the matter seems quite simple. 
Transcendental subjectivity is immortal, anthropological 
subjectivity is mortal. However, transcendental and 
anthropological subjectivity is not without relation to each 
other. And here the matter becomes intriguing and complex. 
Transcendental subjectivity and anthropological subjectivity 
share the same immanent infinity that comes with inner time-
consciousness. This is no surprise since transcendental Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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subjectivity is nothing but the essential features pertaining to 
intentionality as such. For anthropological subjectivity this 
essential feature of intentionality is however combined with a 
factual beginning and end. Consequently anthropological 
subjectivity is finite and mortal, whereas transcendental 
subjectivity is infinite and immortal. Let us consider how 
Husserl describes the ultimate end of a human life. After 
remarking the “blendenden, tiefsinnigen Weisen, in denen 
Heidegger mit dem Tode umspringt“ he states, that in the 
genuine phenomenology, death is “das Ausscheiden des 
transzendentalen Ego aus der Selbstobjektivation als Mensch“. 
(Husserl 1993, 332) From the point of view of anthropological 
subjectivity this entails, that it somehow carries or embodies 
transcendental subjectivity during its life. After once again 
having stressed that human beings are mortal Husserl says: 
“Aber jedes Menschen-Ich birgt in sich in gewisser Weise sein 
transzendentales Ich, und das stirbt nicht und entsteht nicht, 
es ist ein ewiges Sein im Werden.“ (Husserl 1966, 381)  
Does this mean that human beings after all are immortal 
in a certain sense? And if so, in what sense? In a remarkable 
explicit theological description Husserl gives us the following 
hint: “Also Unsterblichkeit in gewöhnlichem Sinn ist 
unmöglich. Aber unsterblich  ist der Mensch wie jede Monade, 
unsterblich ist sein Anteil an dem Selbstrealisierungsprozess 
der Gottheit, unsterblich ist sein Fortwirken in allem Echten 
und Guten.“ (Husserl 1973b, 610) What is immortality in this 
sense? What is participation in God’s self-realization? What is 
continual effect in all that is real and good? How can it be 
attained? And do we not find ourselves far away from the 
competence of descriptive phenomenology when posing 
questions like this? Does the question of immortality not belong 
to metaphysics rather than phenomenology as a strict science? 
Have we forgotten Kant’s critical restrictions of pure reason? 
Let us, by all means, make sure, that we do not forget Kant! I 
turn to Kant and what he did… 
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VII. For the consolation of Lampe 
 
The saying goes that in the moment of death Voltaire folded his 
hands and let a prayer out of his heart and out of his wit: May 
the almighty God – (if he in fact exists) – have mercy on my poor 
soul – (if I in fact have one). This is what a prayer must look 
like when the impossibility of theoretical demonstrations 
within metaphysics affects religious life. And when the chance 
to ridicule religious dogmatism occurs Voltaire is of course not 
a man who hesitates. Kant, on the other hand, was not inclined 
to mockery. But nevertheless der alleszermalmer aus 
Königsberg relentlessly demonstrated the futilities of 
metaphysical dogmatism. The existence of God, the 
immortality of the soul and the freedom of the will were beyond 
the scope of theoretical reasoning. Take for instance the case of 
immortality. It is a transcendental condition of the possibility 
of consciousness that “Das: Ich denke, muß alle meine 
Vorstellungen begleiten können…” (Kant 1998, B132) But this 
logical function does not give rise to a sound theoretical proof of 
the immortality of a substantial soul. That we cannot think the 
transcendental I away, that this I on the contrary must 
accompany all conscious acts – this can only through 
paralogisms be applied in an argument for immortality.  
It is questionable if Kant’s servant Martin Lampe 
understood this argumentation from Kant’s first critique. But 
the outcome was easily graspable in all its horror. And so we 
must follow Heinrich Heine and depict the pious old man 
loyally standing in the corner of the room trembling with fear. 
Could it be true? Had the renowned professor really refuted all 
proof of the immortal soul and even of the existence of God 
himself? Tears and sweat of anxiety ran down his face - and 
Heine writes: “Da erbarmt sich Immanuel Kant und zeigt, daß 
er nicht bloß ein großer Philosoph, sondern auch ein guter 
Mensch ist, und er überlegt, und halb gutmüthig und halb 
ironisch spricht er:  »Der alte Lampe muß einen Gott haben, 
sonst kann  der arme Mensch nicht glücklich seyn - der 
Mensch  soll aber auf der Welt glücklich seyn - das sagt 
die  praktische Vernunft – meinetwegen – so mag auch  die 
praktische Vernunft die Existenz Gottes verbürgen.«“ (Heine Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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1979, 89) And with this reasoning in mind Kant returned to his 
desk and wrote the second critique for the consolation of his 
servant.  
Here, as is well known, Kant transposed metaphysics into 
the domain of practical reason where it took on the guise of 
postulates. But it is not easy to determine exactly what a 
postulate of reason is. Let us once again take the case of 
immortality. The moral law is an unconditioned imperative. 
But it demands more than a finite being is able to fulfil. A 
reason that demands what cannot be fulfilled is unreasonable. 
It is therefore a consequence of reason as self-preservation, 
that a must presupposes a can. If a finite being should fulfil the 
categorical imperative, it must be able to do this. Since such a 
state of fulfilment is impossible for a finite being, it must be 
conceived of not as a state but as an infinite progress. An 
infinite progress, in turn, is only possible if the finite being has 
an everlasting existence and so, in other words, is immortal. In 
this way the immortality of the soul must be demanded if 
practical reason is not to contradict itself. When Kant stressed, 
that this line of thought is not a theoretical proof, he did not 
mean to diminish it, but to strengthen it. When elevated into a 
practical postulate, immortality is freed from all its dubious 
theoretical underpinnings. And given the primacy of practical 
reason theoretical reason was even obliged to acknowledge this 
postulate while coming to terms with its own incompetence 
regarding the matter. Of course, when it comes to Lampe, we 
do not know if he could find any consolation in this. 
 
VIII. Transcendental and anthropological  
subjectivity – again 
 
Let me return to Husserl and phenomenology, now having 
ensured that we have not forgotten Kant. From the standpoint 
of phenomenology death is in a certain sense not real. It is 
simply not a phenomenon, and so a limit-concept for 
phenomenology. In this sense it would seem as a kind of 
externalist naturalism to give death any significance in 
phenomenology. And indeed, Heidegger’s “umspringen” with 
death appeared to Husserl as nothing but a relapse into META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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anthropology. Uneasiness with death ought to be below the 
worthiness of a phenomenologist. However, even if death was 
insignificant  in phenomenology, Husserl could not wholly 
exclude death as insignificant for phenomenology. Or at least, 
he had problems doing so. These problems all appear in the 
context of the difficulties concerning phenomenology as an 
institution. This too might seem as an external problem. 
Phenomenology is concerned with intuition of essences. It is 
not, as phenomenology, concerned with the problem of its own 
existence. Or at least so we must initially expect from a 
philosophy, which systematically declares and methodologically 
ensures its disinterest in existence. However, at this point 
Husserl’s strict insistence on the scholastic distinctio realis 
becomes intricate. This intricacy emerges when the late 
Husserl ventures into a variation of the ontological proof of 
God.  
As was the case in scholastic philosophy, Husserl’s 
phenomenology reached a point where existence became 
essential. In this sense phenomenology came to contradict a 
central Kantian restriction: that existence was not a real 
predicate. What I have in mind is the late Husserl’s theory of 
inter-subjectivity as being a conditio sine qua non for 
objectivity and this in turn for the possibility of phenomenology 
as a strict science. Of course Husserl made sure that he spoke 
of  transcendental, not empirical,  inter-subjectivity. But for a 
spectator to phenomenology it is striking that what 
transcendental subjectivity needs in order to realize its 
inherent  telos  and what evolution and history can offer 
converge in mankind.  It is almost as if a pre-established 
harmony was at play. (Of course the position and perspective of 
this imagined spectator is in itself highly interesting and can to 
some extend be examined in Hans Blumenberg’s writings, 
especially in his Beschreibung des Menschen). This need not be 
a slip back into anthropology. The question is, however, if 
Husserl really did succeed in elevating a contingent existence – 
mankind – into a transcendental essentiality? The suspicion 
arises that Husserl, while persistently speaking of 
transcendental inter-subjectivity, unknowingly or even Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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unadmittedly discovered that phenomenology had 
anthropological conditions of its possibility.  
Given his abiding phobia for anthropology Husserl would 
of course reject this. For the spectator to phenomenology, it is 
nevertheless impossible not to notice, that Husserl’s late 
transcendental deductions (sit venia verbo!) are charged with 
subversive anthropological explosives. But of course, for this 
spectator it is hard to decide whether existence is elevated into 
something essential or the essential is made dependent on an 
existent contingency. So oder so – it has intriguing implications 
for the relation between subjectivity and mortality. If 
transcendental subjectivity must incarnate itself in mankind, it 
must be born, even though it in itself – in its pre-objective state 
– is without beginning or end. And if this embodied existence is 
somehow essential for transcendental subjectivity, then the 
death of mankind cannot be without bearing. Can 
transcendental subjectivity remain untouched when the 
medium of its realization ceases to be? Is it not affected by this 
mortality? Or is it rather the other way around? Is the 
mortality of man revoked when he participates in the 
actualization of transcendental subjectivity? Needless to say 
that these questions are the re-enactment of the old theological 
question: is incarnation the descent of God or the ascent of man 
– or is it a passionate transformation of both? – But let me put 
these lofty theological issues aside and return to the mundane 
problem of the institutionalization of phenomenology and 
illustrate it with… 
 
IX. Husserl’s forgetfulness 
 
If evident intuition is essentially to be realized within the 
limits of the human condition, then the institutionalization of 
phenomenology is among the accompanying problems. Let us 
consider more closely why this is so!  
Given that all intentionality is structured according to 
inner time-consciousness it follows, that pure and punctual 
evidence is impossible. There is no primordial impression 
without a retentional-protentional field. Such an isolated 
primordial impression would reduce and confine intentionality META: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy – II (2) / 2010 
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to an atomistic being incapable of preserving itself. 
Intentionality would not by itself be able to establish any 
duration, but would fall apart into fragments. Instead of 
momentary evidence in this sense, Husserl therefore spoke of 
retentional evidence as the highest attainable form of 
apodicticity: “Evidenz in der Retention: Apodiktizität reicht so 
weit, als die zur Einheit der konkreten Gegenwart gehörige 
retentionale Vergangenheit reicht.” (Husserl 2002, 346; 
Sommer 1987) All intentional acts have a temporal shape, 
which is given without sharp limits but in a continuous 
graduality. This clair obscure is already a dim version of what 
traditionally have been hoped for under the heading “evident 
intuition”, but it is the highest version compatible with the self-
preservation of intentionality. However, the narrowness of 
human consciousness entails that even what is held back 
within retention in this dim way eventually must slip away. 
Even though it is impossible to experience the point of actual 
slipping away human beings must recollect. And this in turn 
entails the possibility of forgetting, a thing of grave importance 
for the possibilities of phenomenology.  
Husserl seems almost appalled when he remarks in a 
marginal note to a phenomenological description: “Alle diese 
Dinge habe ich doch im Wesentlichen schon längst festgestellt, 
und es ist sehr merkwürdig, fast unglaublich, daß ich jetzt 
einen ganzen Monat lang mich quälen konnte und sie 
vollständig vergessen hatte.” (Blumenberg 2002, 111) This is, 
as Hans Blumenberg has pointed out, the almost scenic 
depiction of the troublesome relation between the deficiencies 
of the mundane phenomenologist and the methodological 
demands of phenomenology. What can we do to correct these 
deficiencies? Well, what we usually do, when we do not want to 
forget, is to write down! Accordingly phenomenological 
intuitions must be conserved in careful descriptions and these 
in turn most be materialized in writing. This mode of 
incarnation is unavoidable, when transcendental subjectivity 
has taken the risk of aligning itself with a creature whose 
deficiencies include forgetfulness. Husserl states: “Da ist 
notwendig eine sinnliche, naturale Objektivierung der 
Wahrheits- und Begründungsgestalten, es ist Sprache nötig Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
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und Wahrheit muβ zur Leitung werden, wobei die mündliche 
sprachliche Mitteilung zur schriftliche Fixierung werden muβ 
unter vielfältiger und evtl. mechanischer Reproduktion.” 
(Husserl 1974, 349) By means of written descriptions intuitions 
are passed on, not only between different phenomenologists, 
but even within the life of each phenomenologist. The 
strictness of phenomenology lies in the demand that these 
descriptions must not replace intuitions, but only serve as a 
vehicle for intuitions. Phenomenological descriptions should not 
just be read, but they should serve as means whereby each 
phenomenologist can acquire original intuitions. 
Phenomenology is, as Husserls warns, “…nicht “Literatur”, 
durch die man lesend gleichsam spazieren fährt.” (Husserl 
1957, 238) But whether description is a reliable vehicle is a 
dubious affair. We write down in order not to forget, but we 
know that this is not always enough. With time the words 
become ambiguous or even meaningless. The original intention 
slips away. What should be conserved is lost. In this way the 
incarnation of intuitions entails that mortality is inscribed in 
them. 
I need not elaborate on this. Who wishes to dwell on this 
point can turn to Derrida. I for my part shall only point to an 
issue that has been brought to acute awareness since the 
intervention of Derrida: time is not just an ambivalent 
dimension  in phenomenology, but also for  phenomenology. 
Time should be the dimension of accumulation, but might very 
well be a dimension of loss. If human beings cannot retain their 
intuitions in their lived presence, but must hand them over to 
oblivion and death, phenomenology seems a futile endeavour. 
How is fulfilment of phenomenology possible, when it must 
realize itself under conditions such as these? Husserl knew 
only one answer to this question – and it was significantly not 
a theoretical solution but a practical stance that encouraged 
not to be affected by these problems, but confidently work on 
and rest assured that – as he declared: “Alle Probleme müssen 
sich lösen durch genaue Beschreibung.” (Husserl 1973a, 252) 
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X. Eiszeittod and immortality 
 
Addressing the alternative sketched at the outset of this 
article, let me conclude by asking: Is a thanatology of the 
Kantian type sustainable, or must we not in the end live and 
die as the mortals that we are?  
Upon considering Husserl’s refusal to recognize the 
significance of mortality, it may indeed be hard to avoid the 
impression that he does not really recognize its inescapability. 
A heroic attitude does not after all alter the fact that death 
cannot be escaped. However, neither Kant nor Husserl thought 
so. Accordingly they did not attempt to deny the truth of 
human mortality. We know that we are going to die. But this 
knowledge is in an important sense purely theoretical. From a 
practical point of view, it is a wholly abstract knowledge. It is 
suspended whenever we live our lives. To do something in the 
world is to neglect death. Therefore it is indeed, as Heidegger 
showed in his analysis of Dasein, almost impossible not to 
escape death. In Heidegger’s view this was part of what he 
characterized as Verfallenheit. Kant and Husserl would have it 
the other way around. In their view Verfallenheit would rather 
be the regrettable disturbance of this impossibility. 
Considering the nature of our subjectivity it should be expected 
to be the easiest thing in the world to rule out death. It should 
even happen automatically. Unfortunately it is not so. Death 
has, on the contrary, occupied our thoughts. How is that 
possible? The shortest answer is: because we have fallen out of 
the life-world. (Blumenberg 2001; Blumenberg 2010) Husserl 
knew very well that theoretical knowledge could hinder the 
acknowledgement of what we experience in a life-world 
perspective. What we know can make us unable to describe, 
and thus wholly experience, what we persist to see differently 
no matter how true our knowledge might be. Phenomenology is 
exactly an attempt to put such knowledge in brackets in order 
to access the life-world as a realm of ursprünglicher Evidenzen. 
Not the least important of these evidences would be the mode 
of Selbstverständlichkeit in which we live our life as if we were 
immortals.  Kasper Lysemose / Man should not let death attain the dominion of his thoughts  
 
  
453 
 
 
 
But even for Husserl the thought of mortality was hard to 
exclude. It was for instance present as the knowledge of the 
second law of thermodynamic and its eschatological 
consequences, by Husserl summed up in the word Eiszeittod. In 
a remarkable appendix to Erste Philosophie Husserl considers 
the inevitable extinction of mankind and its impact on 
phenomenology as an infinite task. Husserl writes: “Ich weiß, 
daß mein Leben ein Ende haben wird und ich nicht wirklich 
unendliche Werte erzeugen kann, ich weiß, oder wir wissen 
(oder sind in unserer Zeit mindestens überzeugt), daß auch die 
irdische Menschheit einmal enden wird: aber der 
wissenschaftliche Beruf und Wissenschaft als Gemeinschafts-
Kulturaufgabe hat einen praktischen Sinn und ist ein (unter 
Umständen) praktisch Gefordertes.“ (Husserl 1959, 350) 
Interesting in this quote is the word “aber“. For in what sense 
can a practical imperative serve as an objection to a scientific 
fact? Here we are, of course, reminded of Kant and the idea 
that a must presupposes a can. And this reminder proofs fitting 
as Husserl continues: “Für mich als Individuum ist die Pflicht 
“erledigt”, wenn mir der Arzt sagt: es ist jetzt sicher, daß du 
stirbst. So lange ich aber noch ein offenen Lebenshorizont habe 
[...] so lange bin ich in der Phlicht. Nicht die Überzeugung 
leitet mir, daß ich wirklich ins Unendliche werde arbeiten 
können (ebenso für die Menschheit), sondern die 
Vermutlichkeit, [...] daß ich „fortarbeiten“ und immerzu 
fortarbeiten kann, ohne mir gegebenes und bekanntes Ende.“ 
And now follows the seminal sentence: “Ich kann nun auch 
sagen: Ich soll so leben, als ob ich unsterblich wäre und als ob 
ich wirklich ins unendliche arbeiten könnte.“ (Husserl 1959, 
352)  
This is Husserl’s equivalent to Kant’s postulate of 
immortality. It implies that only when I think of myself as 
immortal can I meaningfully take part in the infinite task, 
which in the case of Kant is called morality and in the case of 
Husserl phenomenology. Otherwise it is likely that I give into 
the knowledge that all things have an end and all earthly life is 
in vain. My impetus to begin something – my freedom – would 
be initially paralyzed, if my self-understanding as pragmatic 
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never fulfill it. To let what I theoretically know – or think that I 
know – prevent me from what I should practically do is the 
dissolution of reason, which is both theoretical and practical. 
Reason, however, is nothing but self-preservation and must 
accordingly prevent this dissolution. It must therefore not only 
make a practical postulate of immortality, but in doing so claim 
the primacy of practical reason as well. Having this practical 
aspect of the matter in mind the expression “as if” may seem 
misguiding. It could convey the impression that the postulate of 
immortality is a theoretical clinging to the illusion that we are 
immortal, even though we know better. “I am immortal” can, if 
considered as a theoretical proposition, be imagined in various 
degrees of validity, e.g. certainty, probability or even – the 
thinnest versions – as an illusionary or fictional proposition. As 
a postulate of practical reason immortality has nothing to do 
with all of that. It is a mode of orientation, which a finite being 
who in itself finds an absolute imperative must oblige too if 
reason is to preserve itself. It is the way in which reason 
prevents mortality to have the petrifying effect on its practical 
use, which it might otherwise have. Or as Kant says – and I 
shall conclude with this instructive and beautiful version of the 
naturalistic fallacy: “Eine Ursache weswegen die Vorstellungen 
des Todes die Wirkung nicht thun, die sie könnten ist weil wir 
von Natur billig gar nicht daran denken sollten als geschäftige 
Wesen.” (Kant 1942, 6f.; Recki 2004)  
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